The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis

Analysis 77 (4):735-741 (2017)
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Reductive representationalism is the view that the qualitative properties associated with conscious experience are properties of the objects of the experience, and not of the experience itself. A prima facie problem for this view arises from dreams and hallucinations, in which qualitative properties are experienced but not instantiated in external objects of perception. I argue that representationalist attempts to solve it by appeal to actually uninstantiated properties are guilty of an absurdity akin to that which Ryle accused Descartes of in the latter’s doctrine of immaterial substance.

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David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles


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