The non-existence of “inference claims”

In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell & Jean H. M. Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Sic Sat. pp. 913-918 (2019)
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Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.

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Gilbert Edward Plumer
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (PhD)


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