Results for 'monotonicity'

17 found
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  1.  23
    Embracing Monotonicity.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    A non-embracing consequence relation is one such that no set of wffs closed under it is equal to the set of all wffs. I prove that these relations have no deductive power if they are also extensive and monotonic.
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  2. Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide (...)
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  3.  63
    On the Measurement of Need-Based Justice.Stefan Traub, Alexander Max Bauer, Mark Siebel, Nils Springhorn & Arne Robert Weiß - manuscript
    Need considerations play an important role in empirically informed theories of distributive justice. We propose a concept of need-based justice that is related to social participation and provide an ethical measurement of need-based justice. The β-ε-index satisfies the need-principle, monotonicity, sensitivity, transfer and several »technical« axioms. A numerical example is given.
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  4. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation (...)
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  5. Strategies for Scope Taking (1997).Anna Szabolcsi - 1997 - In Ways of Scope Taking. Springer.
    Standard theories of scope are semantically blind. They employ a single logico-syntactic rule of scope assignment quantifying in Quantifier Raising, storage, or type change etc which roughly speaking prefixes an expression \aplha.
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  6. On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.
    The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...)
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  7. Donkeys Under Discussion.Lucas Champollion, Dylan Bumford & Robert Henderson - forthcoming - Semantics and Pragmatics.
    Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. We extend the pragmatic theory of nonmaximality in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how context disambiguates donkey sentences. We propose that the denotations of such sentences produce truth-value gaps — in certain scenarios the sentences are neither true nor false — and demonstrate that Križ’s pragmatic theory fills these gaps to generate the standard judgments of the literature. Building on Muskens’s (1996) Compositional Discourse (...)
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  8.  43
    The Evidential Conditional.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material accounts which (...)
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  9.  21
    General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures.Franz Dietrich - 2006 - Social Choice and Welfare 2 (26):263-283.
    Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (Epistemic Monotonicity) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not (...)
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  10.  48
    Algorithmic Correspondence and Completeness in Modal Logic. IV. Semantic Extensions of SQEMA.Willem Conradie & Valentin Goranko - 2008 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 18 (2-3):175-211.
    In a previous work we introduced the algorithm \SQEMA\ for computing first-order equivalents and proving canonicity of modal formulae, and thus established a very general correspondence and canonical completeness result. \SQEMA\ is based on transformation rules, the most important of which employs a modal version of a result by Ackermann that enables elimination of an existentially quantified predicate variable in a formula, provided a certain negative polarity condition on that variable is satisfied. In this paper we develop several extensions of (...)
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  11.  30
    Is Classical Logic Monotonic?Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that one of the properties of classical logic is monotonicity, which states that the validity of implication is not affected by the addition of new premises. In this piece, I will argue that this common notion is unjustified since it is motivated by a category mistake. The notion of monotonicity is primarily epistemic in character and can’t be meaningfully attributed to a system. This is acutely clear in the contrast of monotonicity with non- (...), which we tend to associate with defeasible inferences, where reasoners can abandon a previous inference based on new information. So non-monotonicity is actually the reasoners’ willingness to abandon a previous inference based on new information. Therefore, it can be a property of a system only in a manner of speaking. But since non-monotonicity is the reasoners’ willingness to abandon a previous inference based on new information, monotonicity should be understood in a similar epistemic fashion, namely, as the reasoners’ willingness to maintain a previous inference after newly discovered information. By analyzing the problem from this perspective, a classical inference can be considered non-monotonic if the reasoner is willing to retract her previous conclusions based on new information. (shrink)
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  12. Metaphysical Explanation: The Kitcher Picture.Sam Baron & James Norton - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    This paper offers a new account of metaphysical explanation. The account is modelled on Kitcher’s (1981/1989) unificationist approach to scientific explanation. We begin, in Section Two, by briefly introducing the notion of metaphysical explanation and outlining the target of analysis. After that, we introduce a unificationist account of metaphysical explanation (Section Three) before arguing that such an account is capable of capturing four core features of metaphysical explanations: (i) irreflexivity, (ii) non-monotonicity, (iii) asymmetry and (iv) relevance. Since the unificationist (...)
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  13.  55
    Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox.Chenguang Lu - 2020 - Entropy 22 (4):384.
    After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on (...)
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  14.  78
    Essential Truths and Their Truth-Grounds.Robert Michels - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:790-815.
    This paper motivates and defends a principle which captures a systematic connection between essence, truth, and grounding. It says that if a proposition expresses an essential truth, i.e., if it is true in virtue of the nature of some objects, then there are grounds for its truth which involve these objects. Together with the assumption that a fact can only be grounded in facts which are relevant to it, this principle is then applied in an argument against the monotonicity (...)
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  15. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too.Justin D’Ambrosio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the (...)
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  16. Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide.Ulf Hlobil - 2018 - In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2017. London: College Publications. pp. 109-123.
    The paper presents an exhaustive menu of nonmonotonic logics. The options are individuated in terms of the principles they reject. I locate, e.g., cumulative logics and relevance logics on this menu. I highlight some frequently neglected options, and I argue that these neglected options are particularly attractive for inferentialists.
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  17.  80
    The Non-Existence of “Inference Claims”.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2019 - In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell & Jean H. M. Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Sic Sat. pp. 913-918.
    Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.
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