Rational Delay

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Finite agents such as human beings have reasoning and updating processes that are extended in time; consequently, there is always some lag between the point at which we gain new reasons and the point at which our attitudes have fully responded to those reasons. This phenomenon, which I call rational delay, poses a threat to the most common ways of formulating rational requirements on our attitudes, which do not allow rational beings to exhibit such delay. In this paper, I show first how this problem undermines synchronic formulations of rational norms. Then I show how it likewise undermines the most natural diachronic modifications of these norms. Ultimately, I argue that a successful account of rational delay will reject norms that directly govern attitudes or states of mind like belief and intention altogether, in favor of norms that fundamentally concern temporally extended rational processes like deliberation.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PODRD
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-05-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-03-22

Total views
173 ( #34,255 of 64,114 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #32,255 of 64,114 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.