Sur les notions d’usage chez Wittgenstein et Heidegger

AL-MUKHATABAT (13):132-146 (2015)
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Abstract
Nous comparons les notions d’usage et de signification chez Ludwig Wittgenstein et Martin Heidegger. Contrairement à Jocelyn Benoist, nous pensons que l’analogie entre Wittgenstein et Heidegger n’est pas superficielle. La métaphysique de Heidegger explicite certaines présuppositions implicites de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le pragmatisme naturaliste de Wittgenstein peut être théorisé. Notamment la notion wittgensteinienne d’usage, ou de jeu de langage, peut être comprise comme une pratique à la fois naturelle et normative régie par des règles. -/- Wittgenstein’s notions of use and meaning are compared with the corresponding Heidegger’s ones. Unlike Jocelyn Benoist, we suggest that the analogy between Wittgenstein and Heidegger is not superficial. Heidegger’s metaphysics makes explicit some of the implicit presuppositions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s naturalistic pragmatism can be theorized. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notion of use, or language game, can be understood as both natural and normative rule- governing practice.
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Archival date: 2015-12-26
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2014-09-04

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