Replies to Deng, Lee, and Skow

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.
Reprint years
2017, 2018
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PRORTD
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-11-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-10-07

Total views
667 ( #8,732 of 2,454,523 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #35,819 of 2,454,523 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.