Type distinctions of reason and Hume’s Separability Principle

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Commentators such as Kemp Smith (1941), Mendelbaum (1974), and Bricke (1980) have taken the distinctions of reason to pose either a counterexample to or a limitation of scope on the Separability Principle. This has been convincingly addressed by various accounts such as Garrett (1997), Hoffman (2011), and Baxter (2011). However, I argue in this paper that there are two notions of ‘distinction of reason’, one between particular instantiations (token distinctions of reason) and one between general ideas (type distinctions of reason). Discussion of the distinctions of reason in the secondary literature has without fail focused on token distinctions of reason, but I will argue that type distinctions of reason prove problematic for Hume’s Separability Principle. I find a way around this problem that is consonant with Hume’s account of general ideas, but which can hardly be said to be an account which he explicitly or even implicitly endorsed.
Reprint years
2019, 2020
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
QUTDO
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-01-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-04-24

Total views
48 ( #54,926 of 2,446,290 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #48,413 of 2,446,290 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.