Perceptual experience and degrees of belief

Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406 (2020)
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According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still to be favoured over the perceptual confidence view.

Author Profiles

Filippo Vindrola
Ruhr-Universit├Ąt Bochum
Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg


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