Naturalism, Causality, and Nietzsche’s Conception of Science

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46 (1):110 (2015)
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Abstract
There is a disagreement over how to understand Nietzsche’s view of science. According to what I call the Negative View, Nietzsche thinks science should be reconceived or superseded by another discourse, such as art, because it is nihilistic. By contrast, what I call the Positive View holds that Nietzsche does not think science is nihilistic, so he denies that it should be reinterpreted or overcome. Interestingly, defenders of each position can appeal to Nietzsche’s understanding of naturalism to support their interpretation. I argue that Nietzsche embraces a social constructivist conception of causality that renders his naturalism incompatible with the views of naturalism attributed to him by the two dominant readings.
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Archival date: 2018-11-28
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Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism About Objects.Justin Remhof - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):1132-1158.

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2015-10-12

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