The Existential Passage Hypothesis

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for what I call the extended existential passage hypothesis, which entails, for example, that even if reality contains nothing supernatural and if property dualism is true, then death is not the end of a person’s stream of consciousness, that is, a person’s stream of consciousness continues at the moment of death, devoid of his or her memories and personality traits, as the stream of consciousness of another person (or another being) who is conceived and gains consciousness. I articulate two requirements of rational choice that follow from that hypothesis.

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2019-01-02

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