Why Hume's Notion of Demonstration Must Reduce to Probability

In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner (eds.), Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge (2025)
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Abstract

This paper shows that Hume was ultimately forced to conclude in The Treatise that all demonstrative and intuited claims can in fact, be imagined as otherwise. As a result, he was forced to conclude that all knowledge claims must, ultimately, reduce to probable claims, or in Hume’s own, and indisputably clear words: “all knowledge degenerates into probability." As a further result, it is suggested (briefly) that this anticipates Quine’s well-known attack on the analytic / synthetic distinction (Quine 1953).

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Stefanie Rocknak
Hartwick College

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