What is the Value of Faith For Salvation? A Thomistic Response to Kvanvig

Faith and Philosophy 36 (4):463-490 (2019)
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Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that both avoids Kvanvigā€™s criticism and presents a richer and more inclusive account of how faith is intrinsically valuable. I show these accounts of faith diverge in what they take as the goal of the Christian life: personal relationship with God or an external state of affairs. For this reason, more seriously, the non-cognitivist project likely requires rejecting traditional Christianity and its picture of salvation.

Author's Profile

James Dominic Rooney
Hong Kong Baptist University


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