How Can Mathematical Objects Be Real but Mind-Dependent?

In Jakub Mácha & Herbert Hrachovec (eds.), PLATONISM: Contributions of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 159-161 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any one person’s mind.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-30

Downloads
638 (#22,222)

6 months
194 (#11,754)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?