Sobre a recepção do conceito de Verantwortlichkeit de Wilhelm Windelband na antinomia das éticas da convicção e da responsabilidade de Max Weber/The reception of Wilhelm Windelband’s concept of Verantwortlichkeit in Max Weber’s antinomy between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility

Seara Filosófica 7:1-12 (2013)
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Abstract
In the following pages, the main proposal is to indicate how Max Weber has dialogued directly with some prerogatives from Kant’s Critic of practical Reason, following the reception of Wilhelm Windelband’s concept of “responsibility” (Verantwortlichkeit) and his theory of values. In sight of these influences, in this paper will be argued how Weber adherence to the neo-Kantian value concept has made possible a review on the categorical imperatives, which has turned his reading from Kantian philosophy to the proposal of an antinomy between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility inside the Kantian moral maxims. Nessa abordagem será proposto que a recepção de Max Weber do conceito de “responsabilidade” (Verantwortlichkeit) de Wilhelm Windelband, bem como sua revisão de certos elementos da filosofia dos valores neokantiana do sudoeste da Alemanha, permitiram que Weber estabelecesse um diálogo mais direto com os pressupostos de Kant em sua Crítica da razão prática. Em vista dessas influências, o presente artigo argumentará que a maneira como Weber revisa os imperativos categóricos direcionou sua compreensão da filosofia kantiana pelo conceito de “valores”, o permitindo ainda, propor a existência de uma antinomia entre a ética da convicção e da responsabilidade no interior das máximas morais kantianas.
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Archival date: 2018-03-27
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Kant's Theory of Freedom.Allison, Henry E.

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Book Review. [REVIEW]Santos, Paulo Licht dos

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