Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics

Disputatio 1 (16):26-37 (2004)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
81 ( #30,425 of 43,699 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,011 of 43,699 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.