Unlimited Possibilities

In Michal Peliš & Vít Punčochář (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications (2011)
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Abstract
I distinguish between a metaphysical and a logical reading of Generality Relativism. While the former denies the existence of an absolutely general domain, the latter denies the availability of such a domain. In this paper I argue for the logical thesis but remain neutral in what concerns metaphysics. To motivate Generality Relativism I defend a principle according to which a collection can always be understood as a set-like collection. I then consider a modal version of Generality Relativism and sketch how this version avoids certain revenge problems.
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2012-12-26

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