Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (4):646-673 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

Author Profiles

Joe Saunders
Durham University
Martin Sticker
University of Bristol

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