View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

42 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-05-05
    Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism.Joe Saunders & Martin Sticker - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    In this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. added 2019-11-05
    Every Man Has His Price: Kant's Argument for Universal Radical Evil.Jonas Jervell Indregard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant’s argument from his affirmation that we all have a price – we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-09-11
    On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-04-12
    Kant’s Doctrines of Right, Law, and Freedom. Report of the Second International Summer School.Polina Bonadyseva & Alexander S. Kiselev - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):103-112.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-04-12
    Kants Freiheitsargument. Diskussion von Heiko Puls: Sittliches Bewusstsein und Kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung: Ein Kommentar zum dritten Abschnitt. Berlin und Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. 318 S.Rocco Porcheddu - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (2):64-89.
    Heiko Puls’ work Sittliches Bewusstsein und Kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung: Ein Kommentar zum dritten Abschnitt, presents an attempt to show that, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s argumentation for the objective value of the categorical imperative is almost based upon the same principle as the one presented in the second Critique. More precisely, Puls claims that, like in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Groundwork operates with some kind of fact of reason-theory, which means that our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-07-07
    Spontaneity and Contingency: Kant’s Two Models of Rational Self-Determination.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Manja Kisner & Joerg Noller (eds.), The Concept of Will in Classical German Philosophy. Berlin, Germany:
    I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-07-02
    Christoph Andreas Leonhard Creuzer la Discussione Della Dottrina Morale di Kant Alla Fine Del Settecento.Daniela Tafani - 1999 - Genova: Erga Edizioni.
    Christoph Andreas Leonhard Creuzer (1768-1844), che dedicherà la propria vita alIa carriera ecclesiastica e aIle attività benefiche, pubblica nel 1793 - ancora giovane ed entusiasta della filosofia - un'opera che suscita un certo scalpore, le Considerazioni scettiche sulla libertà del volere, sulla quale prendono posizione, polernicamente, anche Fichte e Schelling. Pur accogliendo i princlpi della filosofia critica, Creuzer sostiene che l'idea di libertà come autonornia della volontà, quale Kant l'ha definita, conduca nienterneno che alio spinozismo, ossia alia negazione dei concetti (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-04-19
    Thomas Khurana, Das Leben der Freiheit. Form und Wirklichkeit der Autonomie. [REVIEW]Eleonora Cugini - 2018 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 7 (1):81-87.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-03-22
    The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.Addison Ellis - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos (6):138-164.
    Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-03-17
    Thomas Khurana: Das Leben der Freiheit. [REVIEW]David Jöckel - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 6 (1):29-34.
    https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?start=0&format=html&newWindow=on&freeOnly=&ap_c2=&publishedOnly=&o nlineOnly=off&ap_c1=&search_header=search_header.html&noFilter=1&limit=&direction=citations&hideAbst racts=&showCategories=on&sqc=&eId=KHUDLD&sort=firstAuthor&proOnly=off&langFilter=&filterByAreas=&cat egorizerOn=&jlist=&ap_c1=&ap_c2=.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2017-06-18
    An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation and Significance of Kant's Theory of Freedom.
    Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. To my knowledge, Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that will be my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-06-18
    Kant's Mature Theory of Punishment, and a First Critique Ideal Abolitionist Alternative.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Matthew Altman (ed.), Palgrave Kant Handbook.
    This chapter has two goals. First, I will present an interpretation of Kant’s mature account of punishment, which includes a strong commitment to retributivism. Second, I will sketch a non-retributive, “ideal abolitionist” alternative, which appeals to a version of original position deliberation in which we choose the principles of punishment on the assumption that we are as likely to end up among the punished as we are to end up among those protected by the institution of punishment. This is radical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2017-05-20
    Kants Subjektivistische Begründung von Moral Und Freiheit Im Naturrecht Feyerabend.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Knud Haakonssen, Frank Grunert & Diethelm Klippel (eds.), Natural Law 1625-1850. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
    “Naturrecht Feyerabend” is a collection of student notes taken on a lecture that Kant gave around the time he was working on the Groundwork. I show that these notes portray Kant as proposing a defense of morality and freedom whose “subjectivism” is unparalleled by anything that we find in his major published works. Kant here traces both the normativity of the moral principle that we must treat humanity as an end in itself and the legitimacy of regarding ourselves as free (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2016-12-08
    Kantian Personal Autonomy.Robert S. Taylor - 2005 - Political Theory 33 (5):602-628.
    Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue”—specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15. added 2016-09-05
    Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.
    It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16. added 2016-01-20
    Freedom as a Kind of Causality.Toni Kannisto - forthcoming - In Violetta L. Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses.
    Kant’s view that freedom is a “kind of causality” seems to conflict with his claim that the categories of the understanding – including causality – can only be applied objectively to sensible phaenomena, never to supersensible noumena, as freedom is only possible for the latter. I argue that only Kant’s theory of symbolic presentation, according to which the category of cause is applied merely analogically to freedom, can dispel this threatening inconsistency. Unlike it is commonly thought, one cannot here use (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2015-12-03
    Kant's Four Notions of Freedom.Martin F. Fricke - 2005 - Hekmat Va Falsafeh (Wisdom and Philosophy). Academic Journal of Philosophy Department Allameh Tabataii University 1 (2):31-48.
    Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2015-09-01
    Kant's Conception of Autonomy of the Will.Andrews Reath - 2013 - In Oliver Sensen (ed.), Kant on Moral Autonomy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 32-52.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. added 2015-09-01
    Kant's Critical Account of Freedom.Andrews Reath - 2006 - In Graham Bird (ed.), A Companion to kant. Blackwell. pp. 275-290.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. added 2015-08-28
    Immanuel Kant - Justice as Freedom.Helga Varden - 2014 - In Guttorm Fløistad (ed.), Philosophy of Justice. Springer, Germany. pp. 213-237.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2015-07-12
    Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling.Owen Ware - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
    In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. added 2014-12-30
    The Metaphysics of Vice: Kant and the Problem of Moral Freedom.Jeppe von Platz - 2015 - Rethinking Kant 4.
    In line with the tradition running from Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the idea of moral freedom: that true freedom consists in moral self-determination. The idea of moral freedom raises the problem of moral freedom: if freedom is moral self-determination, it seems that the wicked are not free and therefore not responsible for their wrongdoings. In this essay I discuss Kant's solution to this problem. I argue that Kant distinguishes between four modalities of freedom as moral self-determination and that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2014-12-29
    Kant, Ripstein and the Circle of Freedom: A Critical Note.Laura Valentini - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):450-459.
    Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24. added 2014-12-29
    Die Kategorien Der Freiheit Bei Kant (Kant's Categories of Freedom).Susanne Bobzien - 1988 - Kant 1:193-220.
    NOTE: The English translation is listed separately. ABSTRACT: A general interpretation and close textual analysis of Kant’s theory of the categories of freedom (or categories of practical reason) in his Critique of Practical Reason. My main concerns in the paper are the following: (1) I show that Kant’s categories of freedom have primarily three functions: as conditions of the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be comprehensible as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. (2) I show (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. added 2014-10-22
    Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason.Owen Ware - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant uses the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  26. added 2014-07-08
    Review: Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom[REVIEW]Melissa McBay Merritt - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):529-532.
    Review of Robert Clewis, _The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom_.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2014-06-07
    Kant and the Categories of Freedom.Ralf M. Bader - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (4):799-820.
    This paper provides an account of Kant's categories of freedom, explaining how they fit together and what role they are supposed to play. My interpretation places particular emphasis on the structural features that the table of the categories of freedom shares with the table of judgements and the table of categories laid out by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this way we can identify two interpretative constraints, namely (i) that the categories falling under each heading must form (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2014-06-06
    Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality.Karl Ameriks - 1981 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1):53-79.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  29. added 2014-05-02
    Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? : Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie.Geert Keil - 2012 - In Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann & Bernd Ludwig (eds.), Sind Wir Bürger Zweier Welten?: Freiheit Und Moralische Verantwortung Im Transzendentalen Idealismus. Meiner. pp. 223-257.
    Die von Kant vorgeschlagene Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie gehört zu denjenigen Theoriestücken, die auch für den transzendentalen Idealismus aufgeschlossene Philosophen schwer zu verteidigen finden. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Lehre von der nichtzeitlichen Verursachung. Nach dieser Doktrin hebt die »Causalität der Vernunft im intelligibelen Charakter […] nicht zu einer gewissen Zeit an, um eine Wirkung hervorzubringen«. In diesem Beitrag wird nicht Kants Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie im Mittelpunkt stehen, sondern die Frage, wie das Junktim zwischen Freiheitsrettung und transzendentalem Idealismus allererst motiviert ist. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2014-04-02
    Skepticism in Kant's Groundwork.Owen Ware - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):375-396.
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant's relationship with skepticism in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that Kant's relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to Hill, Wood, Rawls, Timmermann, and Allison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism Kant is interested in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in any straightforward sense (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. added 2014-04-02
    Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan.Nicholas Stang - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106.
    In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. added 2014-03-21
    Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist About Determinism and Moral Responsibility?Ben Vilhauer - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):719 – 730.
    In this paper, I discuss Hud Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, which is based on Davidson's anomalous monism. I sketch an alternative interpretation of my own, an incompatibilistic interpretation according to which agents qua noumena are responsible for the particular causal laws which determine the actions of agents qua phenomena. Hudson's interpretation should be attractive to philosophers who value Kant's epistemology and ethics, but insist on a deflationary reading of things in themselves. It is in an (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. added 2014-03-09
    Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
    In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. added 2014-03-06
    The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):45-71.
    In this paper, I discuss a problem for Kant's strategy of appealing to the agent qua noumenon to undermine the significance of determinism in his theory of free will. I then propose a solution. The problem is as follows: given determinism, how can some agent qua noumenon be 'the cause of the causality' of the appearances of that agent qua phenomenon without being the cause of the entire empirical causal series? This problem has been identified in the literature (Ralph Walker (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. added 2014-01-10
    Kant's Categories of Freedom.Susanne Bobzien - 2013 - In Kant - Analysen, Probleme, Kritik (English translation of 1988 article).
    ABSTRACT: A general interpretation and close textual analysis of Kant’s theory of the categories of freedom (or categories of practical reason) in his Critique of Practical Reason. My main concerns in the paper are the following: (1) I show that Kant’s categories of freedom have primarily three functions: as conditions of the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be comprehensible as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. (2) I show that for Kant actions, although qua theoretical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. added 2014-01-06
    Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism.Timo Jütten - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):548-574.
    In this paper I argue that Adorno's metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno's conception of ‘metacritique’ and on Kant's conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno's analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. added 2013-11-08
    Kant on Moral Freedom and Moral Slavery.David Forman - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (1):1-32.
    Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) “created by us, hence is in our power.” But when our end is the fulfillment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we get other (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  38. added 2013-07-20
    Schleiermacher on the Philosopher’s Stone: The Shaping of Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics by the Kantian Legacy.Jacqueline Mariña - 1999 - Journal of Religion 79 (2):193-215.
    This article explores the early Schleiermacher's attempts to deal with difficult philosophical problems arising from Kant's ethics, specifically Kant's notion of transcendental freedom. How do we connect a transcendentally free act with the nature of the subject? Insofar as the act is transcendentally free, it cannot be understood in terms of causes, and this means that it cannot be connected with the previous state of the individual before he or she engaged in the act. I work through Schleiermacher's grappling with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2013-06-15
    The People Problem.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. pp. 141.
    One reason that many philosophers are reluctant to seriously contemplate the possibility that we lack free will seems to be the view that we must believe we have free will if we are to regard each other as persons in the morally deep sense—the sense that involves deontological notions such as human rights. In the contemporary literature, this view is often informed by P.F. Strawson's view that to treat human beings as having free will is to respond to them with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. added 2013-06-15
    Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2008 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2013-03-24
    Kants Kategorien der praktischen Vernunft. Eine Anmerkung Zu Bruno Haas.Susanne Bobzien - 1997 - Kant 3:77-80..
    ABSTRACT: A brief critique of Bruno Haas’ interpretation of Kant’s categories of practical reason and a reply to his criticism of my paper 'Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant' ('Kant's Categories of Freedom').
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2012-04-28
    The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):555-589.
    Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations