The Simplicity of the Simple Approach to Personal Identity

In Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Giacomo Turbanti & Enrico Moriconi (eds.), Third Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Pisa, Province of Pisa, Italy: pp. 347-358 (2019)
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Abstract
I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature(s) of the simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of focusing on claims regarding the analysability, reducibility, or triviality of the concepts used in simple theories of personal identity, I propose instead a metaphysical criterion to define this approach. In particular, I claim that the simple approach is (best seen as) that family of theories according to which personal identity is a relation that essentially depends on a mereologically simple (or impartite) entity the existence and features of which may be known directly (e.g., by introspection) or indirectly (e.g., by deduction from a series of other premises).
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Archival date: 2019-06-17
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