An Epistemological Problem for Resurrection

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):219--230 (2015)
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Some theists have adopted materialism for human persons. They associate this metaphysics with their belief in resurrection and focus on problems arising from personal identity, temporal gaps or material constitution, but, in this paper, I argue that being a materialist for human persons leads to an epistemological problem regarding our knowledge of God’s life. The only way to avoid this problem is to choose a particular materialist metaphysics for human persons, that is, a constitution theory that emphasizes the irreducibility of the first-person perspective.

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Yann Schmitt
Classes Préparatoires - Lille, France


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