An Epistemological Problem for Resurrection

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Abstract
Some theists have adopted materialism for human persons. They associate this metaphysics with their belief in resurrection and focus on problems arising from personal identity, temporal gaps or material constitution, but, in this paper, I argue that being a materialist for human persons leads to an epistemological problem regarding our knowledge of God’s life. The only way to avoid this problem is to choose a particular materialist metaphysics for human persons, that is, a constitution theory that emphasizes the irreducibility of the first-person perspective.
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Archival date: 2017-10-18
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.van Inwagen, Peter
A Theory of Properties.van Inwagen, Peter

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2017-03-10

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