A 4-valued logic of strong conditional

South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):59-86 (2018)
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Abstract
How to say no less, no more about conditional than what is needed? From a logical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (Section 1), we argue that a stronger account of conditional can be obtained in two steps: firstly, by reminding its historical roots inside modal logic and set-theory (Section 2); secondly, by revising the meaning of logical values, thereby getting rid of the paradoxes of material implication whilst showing the bivalent roots of conditional as a speech-act based on affirmations and rejections (Section 3). Finally, the two main inference rules for conditional, viz. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, are reassessed through a broader definition of logical consequence that encompasses both a normal relation of truth propagation and a weaker relation of falsity non-propagation from premises to conclusion (Section 3).
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Archival date: 2019-03-08
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A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert
On Referring.Strawson, P. F.
Truth.Dummett, Michael

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