Experience and Evidence

Mind 122 (487):699-747 (2013)
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Abstract
I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities that we have in virtue of being perceivers. In showing that both kinds of evidence have the same rational source, I provide a unified account of perceptual evidence and its rational source in perceptual experience.
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SCHEAE-6
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 3 (2015-11-21)
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What is Justified Belief.Goldman, Alvin I.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perceptual Particularity.Schellenberg, Susanna
Competence to Know.Miracchi, Lisa

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2013-03-11

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