MacColl’s Modes of Modalities

Philosophia Scientiae 15:149-188 (2011)
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Abstract

Hugh MacColl is commonly seen as a pioneer of modal and many-valued logic, given his introduction of modalities that go beyond plain truth and falsehood. But a closer examination shows that such a legacy is debatable and should take into account the way in which these modalities proceeded. We argue that, while MacColl devised a modal logic in the broad sense of the word, he did not give rise to a many-valued logic in the strict sense. Rather, his logic is similar to a “non-Fregean logic”: an algebraic logic that partitions the semantic classes of truth and falsehood into subclasses but does not extend the range of truth-values.

Author's Profile

Fabien Schang
Universidade Federal de Goiás (PhD)

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