Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHPEA-11
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 3 (2016-07-23)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Asymmetry Arguments.Marušić, Berislav

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-04-28

Total downloads
851 ( #1,850 of 37,125 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
111 ( #2,793 of 37,125 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.