Nonconceptual Epicycles

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Abstract
This paper argues that perception is a mode of engagement with individuals and their determinate properties. Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. The “richness” of perceptual experience is explained as a distinctive individual and property involving content. This position is developed in three steps: (i) novel phenomenological description of lived experience; (ii) detailed reconstruction of Gareth Evans’ proposal that we are capable of genuinely singular thought that involves individuals under modes of presentation; (iii) re-consideration of the re-identification condition on conceptual contents.
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Archival date: 2016-06-01
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John
Consciousness in Action.Church, Jennifer & Hurley, S. L.

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2016-05-27

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