A problem for the unity of normativity

Analysis 74 (3):404-411 (2014)
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Abstract
A prevalent assumption is that normativity is a unity. In this paper I argue against this assumption by demonstrating the problems it poses to a well known answer to a well known problem for taking rationality to be normative. John Broome's normative requirement relation does indeed avoid that problem, but insofar as the relation is supposed to offer a general characterisation of the normativity of rationality, it fails. It fails because it cannot capture an important aspect of the normativity of rationality, that it is available to guide us. I show that if we distinguish two kinds of normativity it need not fail in this way
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Why Be Rational?Kolodny, Niko

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2014-06-28

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