Embodied Social Cognition

Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162 (2011)
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Abstract
In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general hypotheses about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject these claims. Thus, the case for embodied social cognition fails. Moreover, to the extent that general arguments for embodied cognition rest on these premises, they are correspondingly uncompelling.
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2011
ISBN(s)
0276-2080
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHAESC
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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2012-08-24

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