Mr. Magoo’s mistake
Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306 (2008)
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.Author Profiles
DOI
10.1007/s11098-007-9119-7
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
Downloads
378 (#23,858)
6 months
15 (#58,886)
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