Mr. Magoo’s mistake

Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

Author Profiles

Assaf Sharon
Stanford University
Levi Spectre
Open University of Israel


Added to PP

378 (#23,858)

6 months
15 (#58,886)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?