Why do we need perceptual content?
Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788 (2016)
Abstract
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Consciousness.Campbell, J.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Tye, Michael
The Silence of the Senses.Travis, Charles S.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.
The Representational Character of Experience.Chalmers, David J.
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2016-01-12
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2016-01-12
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396 ( #6,215 of 38,055 )
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43 ( #8,906 of 38,055 )
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