Why do we need perceptual content?
Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788 (2016)
Abstract
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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2016-01-12
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2016-01-12
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682 ( #6,674 of 56,865 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #9,766 of 56,865 )
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