The Model-Theoretic Argument: From Skepticism to a New Understanding

In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-225 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I investigate Putnam’s model-theoretic argument from a transcendent standpoint, in spite of Putnam’s well-known objections to such a standpoint. This transcendence, however, requires ascent to something more like a Tarskian meta-level than what Putnam regards as a “God’s eye view”. Still, it is methodologically quite powerful, leading to a significant increase in our investigative tools. The result is a shift from Putnam’s skeptical conclusion to a new understanding of realism, truth, correspondence, knowledge, and theories, or certain aspects thereof, based on, among other things, a better understanding of what models are designed (and not designed) to do.
Categories
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SHETMA-6
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-05-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-05-24

Total views
42 ( #32,125 of 39,581 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #19,490 of 39,581 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.