Acts and Morals

Metaphysics 6 (1):45-59 (2023)
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Abstract

Smith shoots Jones intentionally but kills Jones unintentionally. How can a single act be both intentional and unintentional? Fine's theory of embodiment construes the compatibility of intentional shooting with unintentional killing through a pluralist framework of qua objects that distinguishes the act qua being a shooting from the act qua being a killing as two distinct qua objects. I compare this pluralist account with a more traditional monist take on qua modification according to which there is only one item there, a single act which is intentional qua being a shooting and unintentional qua being a killing. According to the latter monist view, to be intentional is to bear a relation to a qua property. I argue that consideration of our moral practices from a participant standpoint gives the monist view a clear advantage over its pluralist rival. I end by sketching a monist alternative superior to both.

Author's Profile

Ori Simchen
University of British Columbia

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