Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back

Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391 (2016)
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According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action.
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Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Reply to Simion.Kvanvig, Jonathan L.

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