Moments as Truth Makers

In Werner Leinfellner (ed.), Language and Ontology. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 159-161 (1982)
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Russell wrote in 1918 in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: When I speak of a fact ... I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say 'It is raining', what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions of the weather. The condition of weather that makes my state­ment true (or false as the case may be), is what I should call a 'fact'. If I say, 'Socrates is dead', my statement will be true owing to a certain physiological occurrence which happened in Athens long ago. This classic statement of Russell's version of the correspondence theory of truth is defective on one point only: Russell was unwise to use the word 'fact'. Objects which perform the semantic role Russell accords to facts I shall call simply truth-makers.
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