Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMIIRA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul & Tversky, Amos (eds.)
Higher Order Evidence.Christensen, David

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Precise Credences.Titelbaum, Michael

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-02-15

Total views
1,303 ( #1,421 of 42,984 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
178 ( #2,211 of 42,984 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.