Results for 'logical omniscience'

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  1. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for (...) beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role. (shrink)
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  2. Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.
    It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as (...)
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  3. Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal (...)
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  4. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged Vs. Consequential Commitments.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  5. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on (...)
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  6. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, the Preface Paradox, and Doxastic Commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in (...)
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  7. Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2015 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3):377-399.
    Epistemic logics based on the possible worlds semantics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, whereby agents are described as knowing all logical consequences of what they know, including all tautologies. This problem is doubly challenging: on the one hand, agents should be treated as logically non-omniscient, and on the other hand, as moderately logically competent. Many responses to logical omniscience fail to meet this double challenge because the concepts of knowledge and reasoning are not (...)
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  8. The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
    We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for (...)
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  9. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or (...)
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  10. On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.William J. Rapaport & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668.
    Review of Joseph Y. Halpern (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1986),.
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  11. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  12.  37
    Computational Complexity in the Philosophy of Mind: Unconventional Methods to Solve the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Safal Aryal - manuscript
    The philosophy of mind is traditionally concerned with the study of mental processes, language, the representation of knowledge and the relation of the mind shares with the body; computational complexity theory is related to the classification of computationally solvable problems (be it via execution time, storage requirements, etc...). While there are well-established links between computer science in general & the philosophy of mind, many possible solutions to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind have not yet been analyzed from the (...)
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  13. Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking :311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at (...)
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  14. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the (...) consequences of such knowledge and beliefs, by paying a cognitive cost. The framework is applied to three instances of limited rationality, widely discussed in cognitive psychology: Stereotypical Thinking, the Framing Effect, and the Anchoring Effect. (shrink)
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  15.  66
    Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  16. Logical Omnipotence and Two Notions of Implicit Belief.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica: Debates Contemporâneos. Santa Maria: Editora Fi. pp. 29-46.
    The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical (...)
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  17. Logic and Limits of Knowledge and Truth.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):341-367.
    Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?
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  18. Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    Many theories of rational belief give a special place to logic. They say that an ideally rational agent would never be uncertain about logical facts. In short: they say that ideal rationality requires "logical omniscience." Here I argue against the view that ideal rationality requires logical omniscience on the grounds that the requirement of logical omniscience can come into conflict with the requirement to proportion one’s beliefs to the evidence. I proceed in two (...)
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  19.  95
    Logic in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Central Topics Via Readings.Luis M. Augusto - manuscript
    Logic has been a—disputed—ingredient in the emergence and development of the now very large field known as knowledge representation and reasoning. In this book (in progress), I select some central topics in this highly fruitful, albeit controversial, association (e.g., non-monotonic reasoning, implicit belief, logical omniscience, closed world assumption), identifying their sources and analyzing/explaining their elaboration in highly influential published work.
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  20.  97
    Co o przyszłości Petera Van Inwagena wiedzą Istota Wszechwiedząca i on sam? Krytyka argumentu za sprzecznością przedwiedzy Boga i ludzkiego wolnego działania / What do Peter Van Inwagen and the omniscient being know about Peter Van Inwagen's future? Criticism of the argument for the contradiction of God's foreknowledge and human free action,.Marek Pepliński - 2019 - Przegląd Religioznawczy 272 (2):87-101.
    The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state of (...)
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    An Enhanced Model for Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification.Niccolò Rossi - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-9.
    Rosenkranz devised two bimodal epistemic logics: an idealized one and a realistic one. The former is shown to be sound with respect to a class of neighborhood frames called i-frames. Rosenkranz designed a specific i-frame able to invalidate a series of undesired formulas, proving that these are not theorems of the idealized logic. Nonetheless, an unwanted formula and an unwanted rule of inference are not invalidated. Invalidating the former guarantees the distinction between the two modal operators characteristic of the logic, (...)
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  22. Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Aptamimamsa (Devāgamastotra) = Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord.Vijay K. Jain - 2016 - Vikalp Printers.
    Aptamimamsa by Ācārya Samantabhadra (2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of (...)
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  23. No Rationality Through Brute-Force.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):195-200.
    All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models (...)
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  24. Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):766-811.
    We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The (...)
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  25. Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):93-115.
    Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent to be rational. It is widely agreed that this assumption is problematic if we want to reason about bounded rationality, logical learning, or other aspects of non-ideal epistemic agency. Yet, we still lack a satisfying way to avoid (...)
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  26. Questions in Action.Daniel Hoek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):113-143.
    Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of belief-guided action that explains (...)
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  27. Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.
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  28. Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanz
    An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and the (...)
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  29. Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.
    One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of (...)
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  30. Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the Problem of Quantifying In.Jan Heylen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):89-111.
    The subject of this article is Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA), a theory introduced by Horsten to interpret Epistemic Arithmetic (EA), which in turn was introduced by Shapiro to interpret Heyting Arithmetic. I will show how to interpret MEA in EA such that one can prove that the interpretation of EA is MEA is faithful. Moreover, I will show that one can get rid of a particular Platonist assumption. Then I will discuss models for MEA in light of the problems of (...) omniscience and logical competence. Awareness models, impossible worlds models and syntactical models have been introduced to deal with the first problem. Certain conditions on the accessibility relations are needed to deal with the second problem. I go on to argue that those models are subject to the problem of quantifying in, for which I will provide a solution. (shrink)
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  31. On the Factivity of Implicit Intersubjective Knowledge.Alessandro Giordani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1909-1923.
    The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that (...)
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  32. Non-Normal Worlds and Representation.Francesco Berto - 2012 - In Michal Peliš & Vít Punčochář (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications.
    World semantics for relevant logics include so-called non-normal or impossible worlds providing model-theoretic counterexamples to such irrelevant entailments as (A ∧ ¬A) → B, A → (B∨¬B), or A → (B → B). Some well-known views interpret non-normal worlds as information states. If so, they can plausibly model our ability of conceiving or representing logical impossibilities. The phenomenon is explored by combining a formal setting with philosophical discussion. I take Priest’s basic relevant logic N4 and extend it, on the (...)
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  33. Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Paradoxes of Mathematical Proof.Sergiy Koshkin - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):252-274.
    Wittgenstein's paradoxical theses that unproved propositions are meaningless, proofs form new concepts and rules, and contradictions are of limited concern, led to a variety of interpretations, most of them centered on rule-following skepticism. We argue, with the help of C. S. Peirce's distinction between corollarial and theorematic proofs, that his intuitions are better explained by resistance to what we call conceptual omniscience, treating meaning as fixed content specified in advance. We interpret the distinction in the context of modern epistemic (...)
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  34. The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
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  35. On Conceiving the Inconsistent.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):103-121.
    I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus (...)
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  36. Intensional Models for the Theory of Types.Reinhard Muskens - 2007 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 (1):98-118.
    In this paper we define intensional models for the classical theory of types, thus arriving at an intensional type logic ITL. Intensional models generalize Henkin's general models and have a natural definition. As a class they do not validate the axiom of Extensionality. We give a cut-free sequent calculus for type theory and show completeness of this calculus with respect to the class of intensional models via a model existence theorem. After this we turn our attention to applications. Firstly, it (...)
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  37. Fragmentation and Information Access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford University Press.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  38. A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  39. Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman & Adam Russell Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    // tl;dr A Proposition is a Way of Thinking // -/- This chapter is about type-theoretic approaches to propositional content. Type-theoretic approaches to propositional content originate with Hintikka, Stalnaker, and Lewis, and involve treating attitude environments (e.g. "Nate thinks") as universal quantifiers over domains of "doxastic possibilities" -- ways things could be, given what the subject thinks. -/- This chapter introduces and motivates a line of a type-theoretic theorizing about content that is an outgrowth of the recent literature on epistemic (...)
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  40. Imagine the Possibilities: Information Without Overload.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
    Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in question. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epistemic possibility and show how it can be captured in (...)
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  41. Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Eder - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-21.
    Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...)
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  42. Million Dollar Questions: Why Deliberation is More Than Information Pooling.Daniel Hoek & Richard Bradley - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    Models of collective deliberation often assume that the chief aim of a deliberative exchange is the sharing of information. In this paper, we argue that an equally important role of deliberation is to draw participants’ attention to pertinent questions, which can aid the assembly and processing of distributed information by drawing deliberators’ attention to new issues. The assumption of logical omniscience renders classical models of agents’ informational states unsuitable for modelling this role of deliberation. Building on recent insights (...)
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  43. Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In a possible world framework, an agent can be said to know a proposition just in case the proposition is true at all worlds that are epistemically possible for the agent. Roughly, a world is epistemically possible for an agent just in case the world is not ruled out by anything the agent knows. If a proposition is true at some epistemically possible world for an agent, the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. If a proposition is true at (...)
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  44. Higher-Order Metaphysics and Propositional Attitudes.Harvey Lederman - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    According to relationism, for Alice to believe that some rabbits can speak is for Alice to stand in a relation to a further entity, some rabbits can speak. But what could this further entity possibly be? Higher-order metaphysics seems to offer a simple, natural answer. On this view (roughly put), expressions in different syntactic categories (for instance: names, predicates, sentences) in general denote entities in correspondingly different ontological categories. Alice's belief can thus be understood to relate her to a sui (...)
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  45.  83
    Real and Ideal Rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.
    Formal epistemologists often claim that our credences should be representable by a probability function. Complete probabilistic coherence, however, is only possible for ideal agents, raising the question of how this requirement relates to our everyday judgments concerning rationality. One possible answer is that being rational is a contextual matter, that the standards for rationality change along with the situation. Just like who counts as tall changes depending on whether we are considering toddlers or basketball players, perhaps what counts as rational (...)
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  46. How Can Necessary Facts Call for Explanation.Dan Baras - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11607-11624.
    While there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this (...)
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  47. Thinking Impossible Things.Sten Lindström - 2002 - In Sten Lindström & Pär Sundström (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Umeå, Sverige: pp. 125-132.
    “There is no use in trying,” said Alice; “one can’t believe impossible things.” “I dare say you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast”. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass. -/- It is a rather common view among philosophers that one cannot, properly speaking, be said to believe, conceive, imagine, hope for, or seek (...)
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  48. A Suitable Semantics for Implicit and Explicit Belief.Alessandro Giordani - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse 58 (231).
    In the present paper a new semantic framework for modelling the distinction between implicit and explicit belief is proposed and contrasted with the currently standard framework based on the idea that explicit belief can be construed as implicit belief accompanied by awareness. It is argued that within this new framework it is possible to get both a more intuitive interpretation of the aforementioned distinction and a straightforward solution to two critical problems to which the standard view is subjected. A system (...)
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  49. In Defense of Right Reason.Michael G. Titelbaum - manuscript
    Starting from the premise that akrasia is irrational, I argue that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. Using that conclusion, I defend logical omniscience requirements, the claim that one can never have all-things-considered misleading evidence about what's rational, and the Right Reasons position concerning peer disagreement.
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  50. There is no set of all truths.Patrick Grim - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):206.
    A Cantorian argument that there is no set of all truths. There is, for the same reason, no possible world as a maximal set of propositions. And omniscience is logically impossible.
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