The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies on a development of the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMITQD
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 4 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-12-17

Total downloads
334 ( #7,457 of 37,180 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #20,058 of 37,180 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.