Truthmaker realism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291 (1999)
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We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion of projection, which holds between a judgment p and an object x when the truth of p entails the existence of x. A truthmaker for a judgment p is then a necessitator for p which satisfies the further constraint that it is part of p’s projection. We offer a formal theory of the truthmaker relation thus defined, exploiting ontological tools of basic mereology and the theory of dependence. We then apply the theory to a range of problems connected with generic expressions, ellipsis, vagueness, and indexical and perceptual judgments
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References found in this work BETA
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Truth-Makers.Mulligan, Kevin; Simons, Peter & Smith, Barry
Events and Their Names.Bennett, Jonathan

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Citations of this work BETA
Truthmaker Commitments.Schaffer, Jonathan
The Growing-Block: Just One Thing After Another?Forbes, Graeme & Briggs, Rachael
Fiat Objects.Smith, Barry

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