Abstract

Moral compromise, i.e. compromise on moral values, is increasingly discussed as a promising strategy for accommodating disagreement in pluralistic societies. Political theorists are primarily concerned with the question how moral compromise can be normatively justified. In particular, the debate revolves around the question whether moral compromise is justified for principled or pragmatic reasons. But assuming that moral compromise can be justified – for either principled or pragmatic reasons – is it also feasible? The literature on moral compromise largely neglects to address the issue of feasibility and this paper aims to fill this gap. With reference to research in cognitive science, I argue that moral compromise faces a feasibility problem because moral opponents tend to experience a deep emotional reluctance towards compromising on their moral values. I develop the counterintuitive claim that this reluctance, which I call ‘affective aversion’, is unlikely to be overcome by pragmatic reasons for compromise. Instead, I suggest that the feasibility of moral compromise increases if compromise is motivated by principled respect for other persons. Whether moral compromise is feasible therefore depends to a significant degree on whether it is motivated by pragmatic or by principled reasons. From a perspective of feasibility, principled compromise is to be preferred over pragmatic compromise.