Phenomenology of Social Cognition

Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089 (2015)
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Abstract
Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of evidence capable of playing a substantial methodological role: novelty, reliability, and relevance. I argue that phenomenological evidence lacks all three criteria and, consequently, should not play a substantial role in debates about social cognition
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 1 (2015-11-21)
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Participatory Sense-Making.De Jaegher, Hanne & Di Paolo, Ezequiel

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