Kant on the object-dependence of intuition and hallucination

Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508 (2015)
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Abstract
Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naive realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
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Archival date: 2016-05-30
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kant's Modal Metaphysics.Stang, Nicholas F.
Kant's Account of Cognition.Watkins, Eric & Willaschek, Marcus

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2015-03-27

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