Why there still are no people

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Abstract
This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
STOWTS
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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2009-01-28

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