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  1. added 2018-12-10
    Definition, Bedingungen und Träger des Personseins – drei philosophische Aporien.Gregor Damschen - 2017 - In Adrian Loretan (ed.), Die Würde der menschlichen Person. Münster: Lit. pp. 153-164.
    Definition, conditions and bearers of being a person - three philosophical aporias. -/- In this article I examine the philosophical question of how to define the concept of the person in a non-arbitrary way, how to find out the determining conditions of being a person and how to enumerate the bearers of being a person. I come to the conclusion that the question of a non-arbitrary definition, of the essential conditions and of the bearers of being a person has not (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-06
    Who Gets a Place in Person-Space?Simon Beck & Oritsegbubemi Oyowe - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (2):183-198.
    We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-06
    Prudence and Person-Stages.Kristie Miller - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):460-476.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-22
    Recovering Philosophy as the Love of Wisdom: A Contribution of St. John Paul II.Tarasiewicz Pawel - 2016 - Studia Gilsoniana 5 (1):269-281.
    The article aims at demonstrating that, by his teaching on human person and his action, St. John Paul II implicitly contributed to a resolution of the most serious problem of contemporary philosophy, which consists in separating wisdom from love and substituting wisdom with understanding or knowledge. The author concludes that John Paul II makes a persuasive contribution to recover philosophy as the love of wisdom by identifying truth in the area of freedom, self-fulfillment and conscience, and appealing to man’s honesty (...)
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  5. added 2018-04-17
    La noción de persona en san Alberto Magno.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2018 - In Víctor M. Tirado (ed.), Jornada de filosofía 2015. La persona. Madrid: Ediciones Universidad San Dámaso. pp. 163-190.
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  6. added 2018-01-28
    Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.Brandon Rickabaugh & C. Stephen Evans - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington. pp. 231-256.
    The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...)
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  7. added 2017-12-23
    Markus Gabriel’s New Book (2017) with INCREDIBLE Similar Ideas to My Ideas (2002-2008) Regarding the Mind-Body Problem.Gabriel Vacariu - 2017 - Dissertation, Bucharest University
    It is well-known the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between markus gabriel’s ideas from his book 2013 and my ideas (2002, 2005, 2008, etc.) (see my article or my manuscript). Not amazing, markus gabriel (mg) publishes (2017) more UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas (2002, 2005, 2008)! So, let me investigate mg’s ideas from his last book 2017: -/- Markus Gabriel (2017) I am not a brain. Philosophy of Mind for the Twenty-First Century, Polity Press -/- I draw the attention that markus gabriel (...)
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  8. added 2017-02-15
    Infanticide and Potentiality.Benjamin Williamson - manuscript
    Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel defend the position that infanticide is morally permissible because an infant a few days old does not have a self-concept and thus is not a person. I argue their position is flawed and cannot principally rule out the possible permissibility of slavery.
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  9. added 2017-01-21
    Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood.Arto Laitinen - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2007 (5-6):248-270.
    This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood — the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized — are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a ‘basic view’that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition depends analyti- cally on such (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-08
    Persons Are Not Made of Temporal Parts.J. Stone - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):7-11.
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  11. added 2016-12-08
    How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
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  12. added 2016-09-05
    Conceptual Knowledge: Grounded in Sensorimotor States, or a Disembodied Deus Ex Machina?Ezequiel Morsella, Carlos Montemayor, Jason Hubbard & Pareezad Zarolia - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):455-456.
    If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?
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  13. added 2016-07-18
    Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - Heythrop Journal 59 (2):201-220.
    At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments against dualism fail, (...)
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  14. added 2016-02-15
    Practical Identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - In Benjamin Matheson & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 391-411.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for those who believe in the afterlife: either we won’t survive death (or an eternal life) in the sense that most matters to us or we will become bored if we do. First, I argue that even if we – in a strict sense – survive death, there is practical sense in which we don’t survive death. This applies, I contend, to all accounts of the afterlife that: eventually, we lose our practical identity. (...)
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  15. added 2016-01-04
    La question métaphysique de l’identité d’un point de vue aristotélicien : L’hylémorphisme (d’Aristote), l’ADN (de Berti) et l’essence (de Lowe).Alejandro Pérez - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (1):1-15.
    Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. (...)
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  16. added 2015-06-15
    Persons and Popper's World 3: Do Humans Dream of Electric Sheep?Ray Scott Percival - 2004 - In Jeffrey A. Schaler (ed.), Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics. Open Court Publishing Company. pp. 119-130.
    In the film classic Blade Runner, the story explores the notion of personal identity through that of carefully crafted androids. Can an android have a personality; can androids be persons? The title of the original story by Philip K. Dick is Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The story suggests that our sense of being a person depends on our having memories that connect us with our childhood. In the movie, the androids are only a couple of years old, but (...)
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  17. added 2014-08-16
    Michael Quante, Person.Annette Dufner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):569-570.
    Michael Quante’s book Person offers a systematic and argumentative assessment of the question what a person is and accounts for the multiple aspects that play a role in our everyday understanding of the term. Quante is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a purely psychological account of the person and proposes to base the diachronic unity conditions of persons on the human organism. At the same time he acknowledges that psychological considerations, including the notion of a person’s personality, are important (...)
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  18. added 2014-08-16
    Personen im Plural.Ludger Jansen - 2005 - In Michael Kober (ed.), Soziales Handeln. Beiträge zu einer Philosophie der 1. Person Plural. Humboldt-Studien­zentrum. pp. 27-42.
    Es gibt Staaten und Fußballmannschaften, Fakultäten und Punkbands. Und mansollte meinen, daß diese Entitäten etwas gemeinsam haben, daß sie zu ein und derselben ontologischen Kategorie gehören. Und daß sie sich unterscheiden von Elektronen, Tischen, Grizzlybären, einem Zehn-Euro-Schein, dem neuen Präsidenten, der Amtseinführung des neuen Präsidenten und der Tatsache, daß ich einen Vortrag halte. Mein Ziel ist es, zu zeigen, daß die Kategorie, die alle Beispiele der ersten Gruppe umfaßt, aber keines der zweiten Gruppe, die Kategorie der vereinten Pluralpersonen ist. Um (...)
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  19. added 2014-08-16
    Who has Got Our Group-Intentions?Ludger Jansen - 2004 - In Johann C. Marek & Maria E. Reicher (eds.), Erfahrung und Analyse. Beiträge des 27. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Sym­posiums. ILWG. pp. 151-153.
    There are group-actions, and if actions are intentional, there should also be group-intentions. Who has got these intentions? The groups? This seems to be the natural answer. But then: Groups do not have a mind or brain of there own to form any mental attitude. Different kinds of individualistic analyses of group-intentions have been suggested in the literature. On the one hand there are suggestions to reduce group intentions to a complex of different Iattitudes. John Searle, on the other hand, (...)
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  20. added 2014-05-11
    The Thisness of Nowness and the Highness of Man: A Contribution to Existentialist Thought.Rolf A. Eberle - manuscript
    A tongue-in-cheek send-up of certain aspects of existentialism written by a well-known logician and philosopher who had a serious affair with existentialism in his youth. It was never submitted for publication and is finally being made available here posthumously with the permission of Helen Eberle. To the best of my recollection it was written some time in the mid/late 1980s. -- Gary H. Merrill.
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  21. added 2014-03-10
    Why There is No Concept of a Person. In Gill, Ed. *The Person and the Human Mind*:.Adam Morton - 1989 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the Frankfurtian concept of a person ignored the indexical 'I'.
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  22. added 2014-03-06
    Unmasking the Person.Chad Engelland - 2010 - International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):447-460.
    By showing how the person appears, this paper calls into question the Cartesian prejudice that restricts appearance to objects. The paper recapitulates the origin of the term “person,” which originally designated the masks and characters donned by actors and only subsequently came to designate each particular human being. By concealing a face, the mask establishes a character who speaks with words of his own. The mask points to the face and to speech as ways the person appears. It belongs to (...)
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  23. added 2014-02-10
    Why There Still Are No People.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
    This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that (...)
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  24. added 2014-02-10
    Why There Are Still No People.Jim Stone Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1).
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  25. added 2012-11-04
    A Here-Now Theory of Indexicality.Gilbert Plumer - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:193-211.
    This paper attempts to define indexicality so as to semantically distinguish indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions. The widely-accepted approach that says that indexical reference is distinctive in being dependent on context of use is criticized. A reductive approach is proposed and defended that takes an indexical to be (roughly) an expression that either is or is equivalent to ‘here’ or ‘now’, or is such that a tokening of it refers by relating something to the place and/or time that (...)
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  26. added 2012-08-14
    Review of Yves Tourenne, Introduction À la Métaphysique de Claude Tresmontant. Pour Une Recherche d'Articulation Entre Sciences Expérimentales, Métaphysique, Pensée de l'Église Et Mystique Chrétienne Orthodoxe. [REVIEW]Philippe Gagnon - 2012 - Science Et Esprit 64 (2):304-309.
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  27. added 2011-07-23
    Can a Person Break a World Record?Henk Bij de Weg - manuscript
    Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and (...)
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  28. added 2011-07-23
    Conditions of Personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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