Distinguishing Failed from Incomplete Knowledge

In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić (eds.), Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer. pp. 141-143 (2024)
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I raise an example that suggests that Andrea Kern’s Knowledge View of Perception should concede that a mere perceptual experience can be a potentiality for one to know something on its basis. I argue that the Knowledge View can accommodate this suggestion by distinguishing between two kinds of defective exercises of a capacity for perceptual knowledge, namely failed and incomplete exercises. I explain that, rather than collapsing the Knowledge View into the contrary Two-Capacity View, my suggestion further articulates the definitive insight of the Knowledge View, namely that perceptual experience, on the basis of which one knows, issues from the same capacity as the knowledge enabled by it.

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Maximilian Tegtmeyer
National University of Singapore


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