Perceptual Knowledge

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  1. Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3325-3348.
    According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. “Capacities first” (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow. We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a (...)
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  2. Bodily Self-Knowledge as a Special Form of Perception.Hao Tang - 2022 - Disputatio 11 (20).
    We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing (...)
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  3. Aesthetic knowledge.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2507-2535.
    What is the source of aesthetic knowledge? Empirical knowledge, it is generally held, bottoms out in perception. Such knowledge can be transmitted to others through testimony, preserved by memory, and amplified via inference. But perception is where the rubber hits the road. What about aesthetic knowledge? Does it too bottom out in perception? Most say “yes”. But this is wrong. When it comes to aesthetic knowledge, it is appreciation, not perception, where the rubber hits the road. The ultimate source of (...)
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  4. Meanings of Pain, Volume 3: Vulnerable or Special Groups of People.Simon Van Rysewyk - 2022 - Springer.
    - First book to describe what pain means in vulnerable or special groups of people - Clinical applications described in each chapter - Provides insight into the nature of pain experience across the lifespan -/- This book, the third and final volume in the Meaning of Pain series, describes what pain means to people with pain in “vulnerable” groups, and how meaning changes pain – and them – over time. -/- Immediate pain warns of harm or injury to the person (...)
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  5. On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, S knows that p only if S’s belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. The sensitivity condition is usually relativized to belief-formation methods to avoid putative counterexamples. A remaining issue for the account is where methods should be mentioned in the sensitivity subjunctives. In this paper, I argue that if methods are mentioned in the antecedent, then the account is too strong (...)
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  6. The Nature of Correlation Perception in Scatterplots.Ronald A. Rensink - 2017 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 24 (3):776-797.
    For scatterplots with gaussian distributions of dots, the perception of Pearson correlation r can be described by two simple laws: a linear one for discrimination, and a logarithmic one for perceived magnitude (Rensink & Baldridge, 2010). The underlying perceptual mechanisms, however, remain poorly understood. To cast light on these, four different distributions of datapoints were examined. The first had 100 points with equal variance in both dimensions. Consistent with earlier results, just noticeable difference (JND) was a linear function of the (...)
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  7. Visual Features as Carriers of Abstract Quantitative Information.Ronald A. Rensink - 2022 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 151 (8):1793-1820.
    Four experiments investigated the extent to which abstract quantitative information can be conveyed by basic visual features. This was done by asking observers to estimate and discriminate Pearson correlation in graphical representations where the first data dimension of each element was encoded by its horizontal position, and the second by the value of one of its visual features; perceiving correlation then requires combining the information in the two encodings via a common abstract representation. Four visual features were examined: luminance, color, (...)
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  8. Philosophy of Perception and Liberal Naturalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - In David Macarthur & Mario De Caro (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. Routledge. pp. 299-319.
    This chapter considers how Liberal Naturalism interacts with the main problems and theories in the philosophy of perception. After briefly summarising the traditional philosophical problems of perception and outlining the standard philosophical theories of perceptual experience, it discusses whether a Liberal Naturalist outlook should incline one towards or away from any of these standard theories. Particular attention is paid to the work of John McDowell and Hilary Putnam, two of the most prominent Liberal Naturalists, whose work was also very influential (...)
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  9. Spatial Facilitation by Color and Luminance Edges: Boundary, Surface, and Attentional Factors.Birgitta Dresp & Stephen Grossberg - 1995 - Vision Research 39 (20):3431-3443.
    The thresholds of human observers detecting line targets improve significantly when the targets are presented in a spatial context of collinear inducing stimuli. This phenomenon is referred to as spatial facilitation, and may reflect the output of long-range interactions between cortical feature detectors. Spatial facilitation has thus far been observed with luminance-defined, achromatic stimuli on achromatic backgrounds. This study compares spatial facilitation with line targets and collinear, edge-like inducers defined by luminance contrast to spatial facilitation with targets and inducers defined (...)
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  10. Editorial: PerceptualGrouping — The State of The Art.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:67.
    Perceptual neuroscience has identified mechanisms of perceptual grouping which account for the ways in which visual sensitivity to ordered structure and regularities expresses itself, in behavior and in the brain. The need to actively construct order, notably representations of objects in depth, is mandated as soon as visual signals reach the retina, given the occlusion of retinal signals by retinal veins and other retinal elements or blur. Multiple stages of neural processing transform fragmented signals into visual key representations of 3D (...)
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  11. Illusory Form From Inducers with Opposite Contrast Polarity: Evidence for Multi-Stage Integration.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 1996 - Perception and Psychophysics 1 (58):111-124..
    The perception of brightness differences in Ehrenstein figures and of illusory contours in phase-shifted line gratings was investigated as a function of the contrast polarity of the inducing elements. We presented either continuous lines or line-like arrangements composed of aligned dashes or dots whose spacing was varied. A yes/no procedure was used in which naive observers had to decide whether or not they perceived a brightness difference in a given Ehrenstein figure or an illusory contour in a phase-shifted line grating. (...)
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  12. Spinoza on Activity in Sense Perception.Valtteri Viljanen - 2014 - In José Filipe Silva & Mikko Yrjönsuuri (eds.), Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 241-254.
    There can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for Spinoza, completely passive. In this essay I argue argues that there is in the Ethics an elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain a definite active component. This argument (...)
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  13. On Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism[REVIEW]Mira Magdalena Sickinger - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):495–502.
    This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.
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  14. Is Perception Essentially Perspectival? Modality in Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Wallner - forthcoming - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis.
    Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no—and there cannot be—perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper (...)
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  15. Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy.Brian Glenney & Gabriele Ferretti (eds.) - 2020 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    In 1688 the Irish scientist and politician William Molyneux sent a letter to the philosopher John Locke. In it, he asked him a question: could someone who was born blind, and able to distinguish a globe and a cube by touch, be able to immediately distinguish and name these shapes by sight if given the ability to see? -/- The philosophical puzzle offered in Molyneux’s letter fascinated not only Locke, but major thinkers such as Leibniz, Berkeley, Diderot, Reid, and numerous (...)
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  16. Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW]Robert A. Wilson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):117-132.
    In this initially daunting but ultimately enjoyable and informative book, Mohan Matthen argues that this tradition is mistaken about both the processes of perception or sensing and the relationship between sensation, perception, and cognition. Since this tradition is sufficiently alive and well in the contemporary literature to constitute something like the received view of perception and the role of sensation in it, Matthen’s challenge and the alternative view he proposes are potentially significant. Sensory systems, Matthen thinks, are primarily devices for (...)
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  17. The Cognitive Architecture of Perception.Juan Vázquez (ed.) - 2014 - Universidade de Porto.
    Putting forward an original analysis of perceiving as a cognitive attitude, as it contrasts with judging, believing and knowing, the author approaches several issues in the philosophy of perception, such as differences between presentation and representation, the natures of concepts and categorization, the justification of perceptual beliefs and their role in the justification of knowledge. His approach is influenced by phenomenology and by psychology and neuroscience of vision.
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  18. Dynamic Characteristics of Spatial Mechanisms Coding Contour Structures.Birgitta Dresp - 1999 - Spatial Vision 12:29-42.
    Spatial facilitation has been observed with luminance-defined, achromatic stimuli on achromatic backgrounds as well as with targets and inducers defined by colour contrast. This paper reviews psychophysical results from detection experiments with human observers showing the conditions under which spatially separated contour inducers facilitate the detection of simultaneously presented target stimuli. The findings point towards two types of spatial mechanisms: (i) Short-range mechanisms that are sensitive to narrowly spaced stimuli of small size and, at distinct target locations, selective to the (...)
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  19. “Things Unreasonably Compulsory”: A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Cognitio 15 (1):89-112.
    Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.
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  20. Causal Efficacy of Representational Content in Spinoza.Valtteri Viljanen - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (1):17-34.
    Especially in the appendix to the opening part of his Ethics, Spinoza discusses teleology in a manner that has earned him the status of a staunch critic of final causes. Much of the recent lively discussion concerning this complex and difficult issue has revolved around the writings of Jonathan Bennett who maintains that Spinoza does, in fact, reject all teleology. Especially important has been the argument claiming that because of his basic ontology, Spinoza cannot but reject thoughtful teleology, that is, (...)
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  21. Lonergan and Perceptual Direct Realism: Facing Up to the Problem of the External Material World.Greg Hodes - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):203-220.
    In this paper I call attention to the fact that Lonergan gives two radically opposed accounts of how sense perception relates us to the external world and of how we know that this relation exists. I argue that the position that Lonergan characteristically adopts is not the one implied by what is most fundamental in his theory of cognition. I describe the initial epistemic position with regard to the problem of skepticism about the external material world that is in fact (...)
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  22. Perception and Corrigibility.Bruce N. Langtry - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):369-372.
    This paper, the first of mine to be published, criticizes some arguments against the logical (i.e., metaphysical) possibility that there is incorrigible knoweledge of the external world.
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Dogmatism about Perception
  1. Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In McCain Kevin, Stapleford Scott & Steup Matthias (eds.), Seemings: New Angles, New Arguments. New York: Routledge.
    Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification. This challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the “Looks View” of visual justification, which entails that our visual beliefs that are allegedly immediately justified are in fact mediately justified based on our independent beliefs about the looks of things. This paper shows that McGrath’s arguments are unsound or, at the very least, that they do not cause genuine concern for the species of dogmatism (...)
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  2. Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.
    This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight—by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study—a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate do not line (...)
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  3. The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: What is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology – including quite similar ones (...)
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  4. Thinking Through Illusion.Dominic Alford‐Duguid - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):617-638.
    Perception of a property (e.g. a colour, a shape, a size) can enable thought about the property, while at the same time misleading the subject as to what the property is like. This long-overlooked claim parallels a more familiar observation concerning perception-based thought about objects, namely that perception can enable a subject to think about an object while at the same time misleading her as to what the object is like. I defend the overlooked claim, and then use it to (...)
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  5. Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Our main aims in this paper is to discuss and criticise the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis we label Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, we embed it, first, in a (...)
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  6. Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.
    Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we (...)
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  7. "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  8. "Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify (...)
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  9. "Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
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  10. "Table of Contents and Acknowledgments" of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
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  11. "The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one (...)
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  12. "Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.
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  13. "Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters.
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  14. Benign Infinity.Matthias Steup - 2019 - In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein. Springer Verlag. pp. 235-57.
    According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for (...)
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  15. Dogmatism and the Epistemology of Covert Selection.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Nathan Ballantyne & David Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual dogmatism is a prominent theory in epistemology concerning the relationship between perceptual experience and reasonable belief. It holds that, in the absence of counterevidence, it is reasonable to believe what your perceptual experience tells you. Thus, if you are not aware of your experience’s casual history, then it doesn’t matter. Critics object that the causal history does matter: when a perceptual experience is caused in certain ways, it is unreasonable to trust what it tells you. These objections regularly appeal (...)
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  16. Experience Does Justify Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2014 - In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies In Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 55-69.
    According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say that perception is a source of justification for beliefs about the external world. Moreover, reliability does not have an essential role to play here either. I agree, and I explain why in section 1, using novel considerations about evil demon scenarios in which we are radically deceived. According to Fumerton, when it comes to how sensations or experiences supply justification, they do not do (...)
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  17. Intuitionistc Probability and the Bayesian Objection to Dogmatism.Martin Smith - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3997-4009.
    Given a few assumptions, the probability of a conjunction is raised, and the probability of its negation is lowered, by conditionalising upon one of the conjuncts. This simple result appears to bring Bayesian confirmation theory into tension with the prominent dogmatist view of perceptual justification – a tension often portrayed as a kind of ‘Bayesian objection’ to dogmatism. In a recent paper, David Jehle and Brian Weatherson observe that, while this crucial result holds within classical probability theory, it fails within (...)
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  18. The Event of Primary Experience and Philosophy. Metatheory of Experience in Kant and Quine’s Epistemologies.Mykhailo Minakov - 2015 - Sententiae 33 (2):64-74.
    The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical ac-ceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might (...)
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  19. Knowing What Things Look Like.Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the (...)
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  20. How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
    ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this (...)
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  21. Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism.Bram M. K. Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.
    In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, (...)
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  22. Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, your immediate perceptual evidence is limited to facts about your own visual experience, from which conclusions about the external world must be inferred. Cartesianism faces well-known skeptical challenges. But this chapter argues that any anti-Cartesian view strong enough to avoid these challenges must license a way of updating one’s beliefs in response to anticipated experiences that seems diachronically irrational. To (...)
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  23. Response to Critics.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477-488.
    Response to Horgan, Goldman, and Graham. Part of a book symposium on my _Perception and Basic Beliefs_.
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  24. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism can split the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and his reasons for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that (...)
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  25. The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.
    Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were (...)
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  26. Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
    Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being (...)
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  27. The Disunity of Perception: An Introduction.Indrek Reiland & Jack Lyons - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):443-445.
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  28. Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties.Jack C. Lyons - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception.
    Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as (...)
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