Criticism and normativity. Brandom and Habermas between Kant and Hegel

In D. Canale G. Tuzet (ed.), The Rules of Inference. Inferentialism in Law and Philosophy, Egea, Milano. Egea (pp. pp. 29-44) (2009)
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Abstract
In this paper, making reference to Robert Brandom's philosophical proposal - and against the background of Brandom's debate with Jürgen Habermas - I shall endeavor, first, to define the relation between recognition and normativity and then between recognition and criticism; in the final part of the paper I shall suggest a perspective that approaches recognition in terms of capacities. On this basis I attempt to see the critical attitude as something that is founded more on individual potentials than on formal criteria and that is essentially connected with a power of redescription: a dialectical anthropology of recognition is thus the most promising base to account for that which substantiates our critical powers.
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