Against the Fundamentality of GOOD

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The argument that is in question in this article concerns the would-be dependence of one form of value on another. When something is intrinsically good for someone, which is to say, directly beneficial for them, it is so because it is good simpliciter. Proponents of the argument have so-called ‘perfectionist’ values chiefly in mind: worthwhile artworks, striking natural formations, intellectual and scientific achievements. They contend that the fact that engaging with perfectionist goods is non-instrumentally good for people depends on the fact that perfectionist goods are good simpliciter. I argue that the dependency argument is not forced on us by intuitive claims about dependence, or by the need to be adequate to our practices with the relevant class of values. The good for theorist can provide a sophisticated account of perfectionist goods. If successful, the article provides a line of defense for the view that good is good for.

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Nandi Theunissen
Rice University

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