Against Deductive Closure

Theoria 83 (2):103-119 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
THOADC-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-08-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-08-26

Total views
230 ( #24,151 of 58,452 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #18,365 of 58,452 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.