Two kinds of moral relativism

Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (2):187-192 (1995)
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Discussions of moral relativism commonly distinguish between normative relativism (NR) and moral judgment relativism (MJR) without highlighting the differences between the two. One significant difference—a difference between normative relativism and the most prevalent type of moral judgment relativism—is not immediately obvious and has not been discussed in print. This paper explains it and draws out some of its philosophical consequences.

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John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis


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