Confucian Rights as a "Fallback Apparatus” 作为“备用机制”的儒家权利

Academic Monthly 学术月刊 45 (11):41-49 (2013)
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Abstract

Liang Tao and Kuang Zhao, trans. Confucian rights can be characterized as a kind of “fallback apparatus,” necessary only when preferred mechanisms—for example, familial and neighborly care or traditional courtesies—would otherwise fail to protect basic human interests. In this paper, I argue that the very existence of such rights is contingent on their ability to function as remedies for dysfunctional social relationships or failures to develop the virtues that sustain harmonious Confucian relationships. Moreover, these remedies are not, strictly speaking, rights-based, for having a right consists in having the power to claim one's rights for oneself, which the classical Confucians would curtail. I conclude by noting how we might revise standard assumptions about the practice of “claiming one's rights” to make it more compatible with core Confucian principles. 梁涛 匡钊译 儒家权利可称为是一种“备用机制”(fallback apparatus),诉诸权利仅当其他首选机制,如家族与邻里的关怀或对传统礼俗的依赖等,不能有效维护人们的基本利益时才是必要的。儒家权利的存在取决于其补救功能,其需要补救的是儒家谐社会关系及相应美德中出现的危机、过失。但儒家的补救并不完全是基于权利之上的,古典儒家不认为人民可以代表自己提出主张,也不认为民众可以直接推翻昏庸的暴君,有抵抗权的主要是汤、武等第一级的贵族。对于儒家国家来讲,从制度上认可人民的权利主张可能是获得社会和谐最有效的手段。

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Justin Tiwald
University of Hong Kong

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