Personal identity and the Phineas Gage effect

Analysis 75 (3):396-405 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Phineas Gage’s story is typically offered as a paradigm example supporting the view that part of what matters for personal identity is a certain magnitude of similarity between earlier and later individuals. Yet, reconsidering a slight variant of Phineas Gage’s story indicates that it is not just magnitude of similarity, but also the direction of change that affects personal identity judgments; in some cases, changes for the worse are more seen as identity-severing than changes for the better of comparable magnitude. Ironically, thinking carefully about Phineas Gage’s story tells against the thesis it is typically taken to support.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TOBPIA
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-02-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Beyond “Identity”.Brubaker, Rogers & Cooper, Frederick
Persons and Their Pasts.Shoemaker, Sydney

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Folk Teleology Drives Persistence Judgments.Rose, David; Schaffer, Jonathan & Tobia, Kevin
The Essence of Essentialism.E. Newman, George & Knobe, Joshua

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-06-17

Total downloads
80 ( #23,605 of 37,119 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #16,274 of 37,119 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.